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CIVIL PROCEDURE-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Access to the
Courts and the Medical Malpractice Act: Jiron v. Mahlab

I. INTRODUCTION

The New Mexico Medical Malpractice Act (the "Act"),' was enacted
in 1976 as an attempt by the Legislature to ensure the availability of
health care at a reasonable cost for the people of New Mexico. The
Legislature sought to achieve this goal by making professional liability
insurance for health care providers easier to obtain.' One of the provisions
of the Act requires a plaintiff wishing to bring a medical malpractice
action to seek review of his claim by the Medical Review Commission
prior to filing an action with any court.3 In Jiron v. Mahlab,4 the New
Mexico Supreme Court found this requirement unconstitutional as applied
to plaintiffs who purportedly would lose personal jurisdiction over a
defendant because of the delay involved in going to the Commission. 5
The court ruled that the statute violated the plaintiffs' due process right
of access to the courts. 6
1. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§41-5-1 to -28 (Rep. Pamp. 1982).
The Act possesses several reform-oriented provisions. It authorizes the creation of a Medical
Review Commission composed of health care providers and attorneys. Id. § 41-5-14. All claims for
alleged acts of malpractice must be evaluated and adjudged by the Commission before any action
is filed with the district court. Id. §41-5-15. The Commission's decision is advisory and does not
bind the parties in any way. Id. § 41-5-20. The three-year statute of limitations applicable to medical
malpractice actions, id. §41-5-13, is tolled from the time of submission of the case to the Commission
until thirty days after the Commission's decision is entered. Id. § 41-5-22. The Act limits a claimant's
maximum recovery for one occurrence to $500,000, excluding punitive damages and medical costs.
Id. § 41-5-6(A).
The Act does not cover all health care providers in the state; the system is voluntary. To qualify
for coverage under the Act, a health care provider must either show proof of malpractice liability
insurance or post a bond. All covered providers must also pay an additional state surcharge. Id.

§41-5-5.

The case of Jiron v. Mahlab, 99 N.M. 425, 659 P.2d 311 (1983), deals exclusively with the
provision mandating that the claim be submitted to the Medical Review Commission prior to filing
any court action, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-5-15(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1982).
2. The Legislature acted in response to a statewide medical malpractice crisis. Medical costs were
rapidly escalating, and health care providers were finding it increasingly difficult to obtain malpractice
insurance. See generally Kovnat, Medical MalpracticeLegislation in New Mexico, 7 N.M.L. Rev.
5, 7-10 (1976-77).
3. N.M. Stat. Ann. §41-5-15(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1982) provides: "No malpractice action may be
filed in any court against a qualifying health care provider before application is made to the medical
review commission and its decision is rendered."
4. 99 N.M. 425, 659 P.2d 311 (1983).
5. Id. at 427, 659 P.2d at 313.
6. Id. at 428, 659 P.2d at 314.
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This Note criticizes the Jiron court's holding that the statute violated
the plaintiffs' right to due process. It proposes a simpler resolution of the
problem of loss of personal jurisdiction over the defendant: the court
should have considered the alternatives to personal service of process
prescribed by the New Mexico long-arm statute7 and Rule 4 of the New
Mexico Rules of Civil Procedure.'
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In May, 1982, the plaintiffs, Anna Jiron and her husband, Alfred, sought
to bring a medical malpractice action against the defendant-physician,
Dr. Benjamin Mahlab, and his employer, Medical Emergency Services,
Inc. 9 The plaintiffs alleged that Dr. Mahlab's treatment had caused permanent injury to Mrs. Jiron's esophagus and vocal cords.'" During the
preliminary preparation of the case, the plaintiffs discovered that the
defendant-physician was planning an extended tour of Southeast Asia and
would be difficult to contact during his absence. 1" The plaintiffs, anticipating that this defendant would soon be unavailable for service of process, filed suit in the Valencia County District Court and immediately
served the defendant with process. 12 In doing so, the plaintiffs failed to
abide by the requirement of the Medical Malpractice Act which provides:
"No malpractice action may be filed in any court

. . .

before application

is made to the medical review commission and its decision is rendered. ""
The district court dismissed the action without prejudice for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction due to the plaintiffs' failure to abide by this provision
of the Act. " The court, however, granted leave to file an interlocutory
appeal. '" After the court of appeals declined to review the case, the New
Mexico Supreme Court granted the plaintiffs' petition for certiorari.' 6 In
a 3-2 decision, the supreme court reversed the decision of the district
court and held that the plaintiffs in this case could initiate their suit without
first submitting their claim to the Medical Review Commission. "7
III. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
In Jiron v. Mahlab, the New Mexico Supreme Court ruled that the
Medical Malpractice Act unconstitutionally violated the plaintiffs' due
7. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 38-1-16 (1978).
8. N.M. R. Civ. P. 4.
9. Jiron, 99 N.M. at 426, 659 P.2d at 312.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-5-15(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1982).
14. Jiron, 99 N.M. at 426, 659 P.2d at 312.
15. Id. The district court acted pursuant to N.M. Stat. Ann. § 39-3-4 (1978).
16. Jiron, 99 N.M. at 426, 659 P.2d at 312.
17. Id. at 428, 659 P.2d at 314.
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process right of access to the courts. 18 The court reasoned that the delay
caused by the requirement that plaintiffs seek a hearing with the Medical
Review Commission before filing a court action would unduly prejudice
these plaintiffs, because the plaintiffs would thereby lose personal jurisdiction over a defendant who would soon be leaving the state. 9 The court
ruled that the plaintiffs were deprived of a protected right of access to
the courts by operation of the statute because, as a practical matter, it
would be difficult to serve the defendant in Southeast Asia.2 ° The court
considered the prejudicial delay suffered by the plaintiffs to be an unconstitutional burden on their right of access to the courts. The court,
therefore, held the Act unconstitutional as applied to these plaintiffs. 2
The decision in Jiron was accompanied by a vigorous dissent.22 The
dissent argued that the court should not make an "unconstitutional as
applied" exception for these plaintiffs. 23 The dissent accused the majority
of disregarding "[t]he plain meaning of the statute . . . to avoid a harsh

result." 24 The dissent believed that, in so doing, the majority had abused
one of the basic principles of statutory interpretation by refusing to accept
the presumptive constitutionality of an act of the Legislature. The majority's adjudication of the question on constitutional grounds should have
been avoided, the dissent claimed, particularly because there was a nonconstitutional basis for upholding the legislative act.25 The dissent maintained that the New Mexico long-arm statute which provides for service
of process outside the state for any cause of action arising from "the
commission of a tortious act within this state" 26 was a sufficient safeguard
to protect a plaintiff from the loss of personal jurisdiction over a defendant
in a tort action.27
18. Id.
19. Id.at 427, 659 P.2d at 313.
20. Id.at 427-28, 659 P.2d at 313-14.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 428, 659 P.2d at 314 (Stowers, J., Riordan, J., dissenting).
23. "If the majority feels that the statute is unconstitutional, the appropriate measure would be
to say so and allow the Legislature to remedy the problem." Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. (citing Seidenberg v. New Mexico Board of Medical Examiners, 80 N.M. 135, 452 P.2d
469 (1969), and Village of Deming v. Hosdreg Co., 62 N.M. 18, 303 P.2d 920 (1956), as examples
of decisions that avoided deciding a question on constitutional grounds).
26. The dissent advocated the use of N.M. Stat. Ann. § 38-1-16 (1978), which provides in part:
A. Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who ...
does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself or his
personal representative to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any cause
of action arising from:
(3) the commission of a tortious act within this state ....
B. Service of process may be made upon any person subject to the jurisdiction
of the courts of this state under this section by personally serving the summons
upon the defendant outside this state and such service has the same force and
effect as though service had been personally made within this state. . ..
See 99 N.M. at 428, 659 P.2d at 314 (Stowers, J., Riordan, J., dissenting).
27. 99 N.M. at 428, 659 P.2d at 314 (Stowers, J., Riordan, J., dissenting).
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A. The Due Process Question
The Jiron majority concluded that the Medical Malpractice Act deprived the plaintiffs of their right of access to the courts without due
process of law.2" The court, however, failed to articulate the standard of
review it applied in reaching this decision. Unfortunately, by failing to
consider the difference between a liberty interest and a property interest,
the court may have misapplied the United States Supreme Court's reasoning in Boddie v. Connecticut,29 upon which it relied.
The Jiron court relied on Boddie to show that the state cannot deny
access to the courts to an individual who seeks redress of a protected
right.30 In Boddie, the petitioner sought access to the courts in order to
obtain a divorce when the only available means of doing so was by
resorting to the judicial process. 3' The United States Supreme Court
determined that an indigent plaintiff who was denied access to the courts
while seeking to exercise a fundamental right was deprived of due pro
cess. 3 The Court, however, expressly stated that it did not decide that
"access for all individuals to the courts is a right that is, in all circumstances, guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.... ""
The meaning of this limiting language became clearer in the subsequent
case of United States v. Kras.34 In Kras, the Court distinguished Boddie
and refused to recognize a constitutionally protected right of access to
the courts for an indigent petitioning for bankruptcy.35 The Supreme Court
held that the interest of discharging one's debts in bankruptcy did not
rise to the same constitutional level as the right to adjust one's marital
relationship.36
Boddie and Kras demonstrate that the United States Supreme Court
does not recognize an absolute due process right of access to the courts;
99 N.M. at 427-28, 659 P.2d at 313-14.
401 U.S. 371 (1971).
99 N.M. at 426, 659 P.2d at 312.
401 U.S. at 380.
Id. at 380-81.
Id. at 382.
409 U.S. 434 (1973).
Id. at 444-46. For an opposing view, see Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion in Kras:
When a person raises a claim of right or entitlement under the laws, the only
forum in our legal system empowered to determine that claim is a court....
There is no way to determine whether he has such a right except by adjudicating
his claim. Failure to do so denies him access to the courts.
Id. at 462-63 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
Commentators on the Kras decision have criticized the majority's failure to recognize access to
the courts as a fundamental right. See, e.g., Note, Supreme Court Denies Indigents Access to the
Courts, 8 Val. U.L. Rev. 455, 462-64 (1974); Note, United States v. Kras: Justice at a Price, 40
Brooklyn L. Rev. 147, 173-74 (1973).
36. 409 U.S. at 445. Cf. Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973) (filing fee did not deny due
process to indigents seeking to appeal an adverse welfare decision).
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
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rather, it is the nature of the underlying interest that determines whether
the due process clause protects access to the courts. The United States
Supreme Court in Boddie was protecting a recognized liberty interest.37
Kras, on the other hand, involved an economically based property interest. 38 The difference in outcomes of the two cases may be explained
by the different standards of review the Court employs when considering
economic and property interests on the one hand, and liberty interests on
the other. Although the fourteenth amendment protects both liberty and
property interests, 39 the United States Supreme Court has emphasized that
property interests are not created by the Constitution.' While the Court
strictly scrutinizes any attempt by a state to limit the exercise of a fundamental liberty interest (e.g. the right to dissolve one's marriage), 4' the
Court is generally willing to defer to a state's determination as to which
economic and property interests deserve protection. 42 As a result, liberty
and property interests are on a different constitutional footing. Unlike
liberty interests, which are either expressly mentioned in the Constitution
(such as the freedoms of speech and religion)43 or implicit in the Constitution (the right to marry and the right of privacy)," "[tihe hallmark
""
of property. . . is an individual entitlement grounded in state law. ....
1. The Right to Bring a Tort Action as a Property Right under the
Due Process Clause
The right to bring a tort claim is a species of property created by the
common law and protected by the due process clause.' A state may erect
reasonable procedural requirements for triggering this right.47 While the
state cannot take away the right to an adjuducation without due process,
the procedure may be changed at the will, or even at the whim, of the
legislature. 4 Individuals do not have a vested interest in any particular
37. 401 U.S. at 376. Prior to Boddie, the Supreme Court had already determined that decisions
involving marriage are constitutionally protected aspects of the right of privacy, implicit in the
fourteenth amendment's concept of liberty. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (right to
marry a person of a different race); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right of married
persons to obtain contraceptives).
38. 409 U.S. at 446.
39. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1: "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law .. "
40. Board of Regents v. Roth,. 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
41. See the Court's discussion in Boddie, 401 U.S. at 374-75.
42. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955); United States v. Carolene Products
Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938); see generally Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property", 62 Cornell L.
Rev. 405 (1977).
43. U.S. Const. amend. I.
44. See supra note 37.
45. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 430 (1982).
46. Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 281-82 (1980).
47. Logan, 455 U.S. at 437.
48. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1877).
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form of procedure that defines one's right to claim a property interest.49
The United States Supreme Court has stated that "the State's interest in
fashioning its own rules of tort law is paramount to any discernible federal
interest, except perhaps an interest in protecting the individual citizen
from state action that is wholly arbitrary or irrational." 5 State courts
have upheld laws modifying the common law procedures for redress of
personal injuries and injuries to property even though they burden or
delay access to the courts.5 1
A state may modify many incidents of bringing a tort claim without
violating due process. In fact, prior to Jiron, the New Mexico Court of
Appeals upheld a due process challenge to a section of the Medical
Malpractice Act which modified the statute of limitations applicable to
wrongful death actions resulting from a physician's malpractice. 52 The
court of appeals concluded that the Legislature had a rational basis for
providing such a limitation. 53 The Jiron dissent similarly advocated a
deferential stance towards the legislative choices contained in the Act.54
As long as legislation is not unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, it
does not violate due process. 5 By failing to recognize the limitations of
Boddie and the distinctive nature of a property interest, the Jiron majority
did not give proper deference to the Legislature in the reformation of its
tort laws. The interest of a legislature in modifying common law rules
of adjudicating medical malpractice claims is not unreasonable, because
the public has an important interest in the low cost and the availability
of health care.56 The legislative determination that a particular procedure
is appropriate provides all the process that is due.57
Once a state has established a procedure for adjudicating a claim of
right, a state may not, as a matter of federal due process, deny a potential
litigant use of the procedure. 58 In Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 59 the
Illinois Fair Employment Practices Commission negligently failed to hold
a hearing within the time required by law, and the Commission subsequently dismissed the plaintiff's claim as time-barred. 6 The United States
49. Id. at 134. See also Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 122 (1929).
50. Martinez, 444 U.S. at 282.
51. See, e.g., Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802, 805 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041
(1977).
52. Armijo v. Tandysh, 98 N.M. 181, 646 P.2d 1245 (Ct. App. 1981).
53. Id. at 183, 646 P.2d at 1247.
54. 99 N.M. at 428, 659 P.2d at 314 (Stowers, J., Riordan, J., dissenting).
55. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 85 (1980).
56. See Everett v. Goldman, 359 So. 2d 1256, 1266 (La. 1978); State ex rel. Strykowski v.
Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 261 N.W.2d 434, 443 (1978).
57. Logan, 455 U.S. at 433.
58. Id. at 430 n.5.
59. 455 U.S. 422 (1982).
60. Id. at 426.
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Supreme Court held that by preventing the plaintiff from using the established procedure, the state had deprived the plaintiff of a property
interest protected by the due process clause. 6 In Jiron, in contrast, the
state did nothing to prevent the plaintiffs from using the state-created
procedure.
Thus, in Jiron, the state's action in creating a pre-judicial screening
panel under the Medical Malpractice Act established a reasonable precondition for access to state courts. The state did nothing to interfere
with the plaintiffs' right to have the Medical Review Commission consider
their claim. Once the Commission had made its recommendation, the
plaintiffs would then have been able to decide whether to proceed with
a court action. On these bases, therefore, there was no violation of the
plaintiffs' due process rights.
2. Tort Claims and Due Process under the New Mexico Constitution
Alternatively, the court could have invalidated the statute on state due
process grounds. 62 In addition to relying on Boddie, the Jiron court also
approvingly cited the Missouri Supreme Court's holding that Missouri's
medical malpractice statute, which was similar to New Mexico's medical
malpractice statute, was unconstitutional. 63 The Missouri court found that
the requirement that a plaintiff submit his claim to a review board for
evaluation before filing suit violated the litigant's right of access to the
courts without delay. 4 Unlike the New Mexico Constitution, the Missouri
Constitution expressly guarantees justice without delay,65 thereby providing independent state grounds for the finding that the statute was unconstitutional.
The Jiron majority gave no indication that it had reached its decision
on state constitutional grounds or that it was interpreting a specific state
constitutional provision. Though the court appears to view a plaintiff as
having an absolute right of access to the courts that may not be "prejudiced" or subject to "undue delay," ' there does not appear to be either
a state or federal constitutional basis for holding that such a right actually
exists. Unless the state constitution gives access to the court's protected
status or unless the underlying interest for which a plaintiff seeks redress
61. Id. at 432-33.
62. The New Mexico Constitution's due process clause simply states: "No person shall be deprived
of life, liberty or property without due process of law .. " N.M. Const. art. II, § 18.
63. 99 N.M. at 427, 659 P.2d at 313 (citing State ex rel. Cardinal Glennon Memorial Hospital
for Children v. Gaertner, 583 S.W.2d 107 (Mo. 1979)).
64. State ex rel. Cardinal Glennon Memorial Hospital for Children v. Gaertner, 583 S.W.2d 107,
110 (Mo. 1979).
65. Mo. Const. art. I, § 14.
66. 99 N.M. at 427, 659 P.2d at 313.
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is fundamental, there is no authority from which to conclude that the
plaintiffs were denied due process under the New Mexico Constitution.
B. The Service of Process Question
The court failed to address the very important question of whether the
absence of the defendant actually prejudiced the plaintiffs' ability to bring
a lawsuit. A litigant's right to procedural due process normally is not
prejudiced as long as he has "an opportunity to be heard at a reasonable
time and in a reasonable manner. "67 The court should have considered
whether the plaintiff could have effectuated service of process on the
defendant under the New Mexico long-ann statute 68 or Rule 4 of the New
Mexico Rules of Civil Procedure. 69
The dissent suggested the long-arm statute as a possible means of
securing personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant in a tort
action.7" The long-arm statute authorizes personal service outside of the
state as a means of securing jurisdiction over a defendant who has committed a tortious act within the state, regardless of whether the defendant
is a resident of New Mexico. 7 The dissent was satisfied that there was
no need to reach the question of the constitutionality of the Medical
Malpractice Act because the availability of the long-arm statute provided
the possibility of relief for these plaintiffs.72 The majority seemed to be
particularly sympathetic to the problems of serving a defendant traveling
in Southeast Asia.73 One wonders whether the court would have reached
the same result if the defendant had been traveling throughout the United
States.
Neither the dissent nor the majority considered the possibility that Rule
4 might have provided an additional method of securing personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Had the justices considered the use of constructive or substituted service for this defendant, the court might have
concluded that the defendant was susceptible to service of process. The
court then would have been able to avoid the question of whether the
Act violated the plaintiffs' due process rights.
The court's failure to consider this strand of analysis could be related
74
to the insufficiency of the facts available for adjudication. The court
67. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940).
68. N.M. Stat. Ann. §38-1-16 (1978).
69. N.M. R. Civ. P. 4.
70. 99 N.M. at 428, 659 P.2d at 314 (Stowers, J., Riordan, J., dissenting).
71. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 38-1-16 (1978), quoted in part, supra note 26.
72. 99 N.M. at 428, 659 P.2d at 314 (Stowers, J., Riordan, J., dissenting).
73. 99 N.M. at 427, 659 P.2d at 313.
74. The basic facts available to the court were: I) Defendant Mahlab was a Canadian citizen; 2)
Defendant was leaving on an extended tour of Southeast Asia; 3) Defendant did not know how he
could be contacted while on that tour; 4) Defendant stated "I may just like one place and stay there
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should have simply remanded the case to the district court for development
of additional facts. The court seemingly failed to inquire into the likely
duration of the defendant's absence and his intention of returning to New
Mexico. By failing to ascertain the likely duration of the defendant's
absence from New Mexico, the court neglected to consider that the defendant might have returned from abroad by the time the Medical Review
Commission had rendered a decision. The defendant would have then
been amenable to personal service, and the plaintiffs' claim would not
have been prejudiced because the statute of limitations would have been
tolled during the Commission's deliberations. 75
The court also overlooked the fact that one of the primary purposes of
the review procedure is to screen out frivolous claims and encourage
settlement of meritorious claims.76 Once the Commission had made its
recommendation, the plaintiffs might have chosen not to pursue their
action at all (were the recommendation unfavorable to them), or, alternatively, the defendant's insurer might have wished to settle the claim
out of court (were the recommendation unfavorable to the defendant).
The problem of service, therefore, would have been totally moot, as the
plaintiffs would not then need to seek a court action.
The plaintiffs did not allege that the defendant would remain permanently unavailable for service of process. Even if a defendant is temporarily out of the state, Rule 4 provides that substituted service may be
effectuated on a state resident by "delivering a copy of the process...
to some person residing at the usual place of abode of the defendant. . . . " If a person has an established home in the state, a mere
absence, even of considerable duration, does not destroy this residence
as a usual place of abode, so long as the person has an intention to
return. 78 The court should have remanded the case to ascertain whether
the defendant was a New Mexico resident, 79 whether he planned to return
to the state, and whether he continued to maintain a place of residence
here.
for a while"; and 5) Defendant left on his tour in June of 1982. See Petition for Certiorari at p. 2,
Transcript of Record on Appeal. The Record is available at the New Mexico Supreme Court library.
The supreme court derived the facts upon which it relied solely from the allegations contained in
the plaintiffs' petition for certiorari. The defendant was not asked to submit any evidence disputing
or supporting the facts that the plaintiffs alleged. The parties filed no briefs, and the court did not
hear oral argument on the questions presented. Per author's telephone interviews with counsel for
the plaintiffs, Ron Andazola, and counsel for defendant Mahlab, Alan Torgerson (Oct. 1983).
75. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §41-5-22 (Repl. Pamp. 1982).
76. See Kovnat, supra note 2, for a discussion of the reasons for enacting the Act.
77. N.M. R. Civ. P. 4(e).
78. See Annot., 32 A.L.R.3d 112, 119 (1970) and cases cited therein at § 27. See also Karlin v.
Avis, 326 F. Supp. 1325 (D.N.Y. 1971).
79. Defendant Mahlab, although a Canadian citizen, was a practicing physician in New Mexico
and thus was likely a resident of the state.
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Alternatively, service by publication may have been constitutionally
adequate in this situation." The New Mexico Supreme Court in Clark v.
LeBlanc8 authorized service by publication even for actions in personam
if the defendant 1) is a resident of the state; 2) is aware that a civil action
may be instituted against him; and 3) attempts to conceal himself to avoid
service of process.12 If the defendant had purposefully tried to conceal
himself, such actions would constitute a waiver of service of process. 83
Under Clark, if the plaintiff could show that the defendant was leaving
the country in an attempt to avoid service of process or had wilfully
refused to cooperate in providing an address where he could be contacted
while overseas, service by publication would be an acceptable alternative
to personal service." 4
Other states have rules of procedure that are more flexible in providing
alternatives to personal service.85 Their rules of civil procedure grant their
courts much greater latitude in determining which mode of service is
permissible in a given situation. For example, Micl;igan's rule provides
that, in addition to formally recognized means of service, "the court in
which an action has been commenced may, in its discretion, allow service
of process to be made upon a defendant in any other manner which is
reasonably calculated to give him actual notice of the proceedings and
an opportunity to be heard ...."86 On this basis, the Michigan Supreme
Court upheld service on a defendant's insurer when the defendant was
unavailable for service of process.87
Unfortunately, the Jiron court did not have the opportunity to consider
expanding the uses or revising the language of Rule 4 because it failed
entirely to address the service of process question. The court should have
declined to render any decision until service had actually been attempted
80. The United States Supreme Court, in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust, 339 U.S.
306 (1950), held that, at a minimum, the method of service chosen must be "reasonably calculated,
under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendancy of the action and afford
them an opportunity to present their objections .. " Id. at 314. Mullane recognized that "in the
case of persons missing or unknown, employment of an indirect and even a probably futile means
Id. at 317.
of notification . . . creates no constitutional bar.
81. 92 N.M. 672, 593 P.2d 1075 (1979).
82. Id. at 673-74, 593 P.2d at 1076-77.
83. Id. at 673, 593 P.2d at 1076.
84. One commentator believes that the Jiron majority implicitly rejected the possibility of obtaining personal jurisdiction over this defendant through the use of the long-arm statute. This would
be consistent with New Mexico law if the defendant were a non-resident. See Occhialino, Civil
Procedure, 14 N.M.L. Rev. 17, 24-25 (1984). However, the available facts are insufficient to
conclude that Dr. Mahlab was not a New Mexico resident. See supra note 79.
85. See, e.g., Mich. Gen. Ct. R. 105.8.
86. Id.
87. Krueger v. Williams, 410 Mich. 144, 300 N.W.2d 910 (1981). See Note, Civil ProcedureJurisdictional Due Process and Substitute Service on the Liability Carrier, 28 Wayne L. Rev. 1553
(1982) for a discussion of this opinion.
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on the defendant, following a conscious decision by the plaintiffs to go
forward with their action in district court. The critical question for purposes of personal jurisdiction is whether the defendant would have been
available for service of process after the Medical Review Commission
rendered its decision. The facts in existence at that time would have
provided the proper context for adjudication of the service of process
issue. Allowing a plaintiff to bypass the Medical Review Commission
contravenes the very purposes of enacting such reform legislation: to
screen out unmeritorious claims and to avoid unnecessary litigation.
C. Ramifications of the Court's Decision
Had the court addressed the service of process question, future litigants
would have been provided clearer guidelines on the application of Rule
4 in instances where it is difficult to effect personal service on an elusive
tortfeasor. As an alternative resolution of the question, the court could
have endorsed the use of the long-arm statute to obtain jurisdiction over
this defendant. Instead the court offered a confusing decision on due
process grounds that may be strictly limited to its facts.
A future medical malpractice litigant may find it troublesome to determine what degree of difficulty or delay in acquiring personal jurisdiction over a defendant will be sufficient to permit reliance on the Jiron
decision.88 A plaintiff may not know whether he can file an action directly
with the district court or whether he must first take his claim to the
Medical Review Commission. As a result of the Jiron decision, however,
two things are apparent. First, practioners should thoroughly develop the
record so that the reviewing court can properly evaluate the situation.
Second, practioners should make sure that the reviewing court is aware
of all the alternatives available to effectuate service of process.
IV. CONCLUSION
The court's decision in Jiron v. Mahlab is very unclear as to the basis
for its holding that the plaintiffs had a constitutionally protected due
process right of access to the courts. The court may have misapplied the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Boddie v. Connecticut.9 Bod88. The recent case of Otero v. Zouhar, 23 N.M. Bar Bull. 670 (Ct. App., June 21, 1984) suggests
that future application of the Jiron holding (that the Act may deprive a plaintiff of access to the
courts) will be strictly limited to situations in which a loss of parties or witnesses occurred through
no fault of the plaintiff. In Otero, the court refused to allow a plaintiff to file a lawsuit in court one
day before the statute of limitations was to expire when the plaintiff had neglected to seek review
by the Medical Review Commission. Id. at 674. The court distinguished the facts in Otero from
those in Jiron. In Otero, the plaintiff's problems arose from plaintiff's own delay in filing suit rather
than from delay in compliance with the Act. Id. at 676. Thus, the court concluded that the Act itself
in no way denied the plaintiff his right of access to the courts. Id.
89. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 14

die dealt with a liberty interest (the right to make marital decisions free
from governmental restrictions) while Jirondealt with a property interest
(the right to bring an action in tort). The Supreme Court's line of reasoning
9
in United States v. Kras9 and Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co. ' seems
more applicable to the interest involved in Jiron. Kras and Logan show
that access to the courts is not, by itself, a fundamental right. A state can
reasonably condition access to its courts, but once the state has created
a procedure, it cannot abridge an individual's right to use that procedure.
In Jiron, any restriction on access to the courts was reasonable in light
of the legislative goal of controlling the number of medical malpractice
claims. Additionally, the state in no way prevented the plaintiffs from
seeking access to its courts through the use of an established procedure.
The plaintiffs, therefore, did not suffer a violation of their due process
rights.
If the court believed that the statute was offensive on state constitutional
grounds, the court should have encouraged the Legislature to redraft the
Act so as to permit all plaintiffs to file their actions with the district court
and to serve the defendants before proceeding to the Medical Review
92
Commission. Other jurisdictions employ this type of procedure.
The court could have avoided the whole due process issue entirely. It
was premature to conclude that these plaintiffs were denied access to the
courts because of loss of jurisdiction over the defendant. The court should
have remanded Jiron to the district court as the case was not yet ripe for
constitutional adjudication. By failing to consider the New Mexico longarm statute and Rule 4, the court overlooked the possible alternatives to
personal in-hand, in-state service, such as substituted or constructive
service. Consideration of the provisions of Rule 4 should be the first step
in situations where service on the defendant presents a potential barrier
to the plaintiff's access to the courts. As an alternative, the court might
have considered amending Rule 4 using language similar to that of the
Michigan rule. 9 A more flexible rule would minimize the chance that an
elusive tortfeasor might be able to avoid service of process. A practitioner
confronted with a similar situation would do well to develop a record
with sufficient facts regarding a defendant's whereabouts and should consider the alternatives to personal service of process contained in Rule 4.
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